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Defeo: Humans of New York

HUMANS OF NEW YORK,
SHUT YOUR BLINDS
Amanda DeFeo*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The right of privacy has been called the most esteemed right
of the civilized man.1 However, it is the civilized man who, with his
intellect, has contributed to a social evolution that allows for the
invasion of individual privacy.2 Today, invasive technologies allow
for the disclosure of the sacred corners of domestic life.3 Due to
societal advancements, the law must keep pace with the changing
times and the progress of the human mind.4 It has become essential
to redefine the nature and extent of an individual’s protection of his
or her personal privacy.5 Photographic technology, artistic trends,
and cultural developments have raised several questions regarding the
right of privacy.6 For example, the well-known project entitled
Humans of New York has attracted over twenty million online

*J.D.

Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A in English
Literature, Fordham University 2013. I would like to thank my parents for their
overwhelming support and guidance throughout my law school career. Mom and Dad, thank
you for always believing in me. To my little sister Danielle, you are my inspiration. Thank
you to all the Touro faculty who assisted me with this Note. Thank you to the Touro alumni,
especially Bridgette Nunez and Ryan Nasim. Finally, a very special thanks to Professor
Rena Seplowitz.
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193, 193
(1890) [hereinafter Right to Privacy].
3 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 97-99 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
4 Right to Privacy, supra note 2; Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 106.
5 Right to Privacy, supra note 2; See also Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 106 (explaining that “in
these times of heightened threats to privacy posed by new and ever more invasive
technologies, we call upon the legislature to revisit this important issue.”).
6 The Privacy Panic Cycle, http://www2.itif.org/2015-privacy-panic.pdf (last visited Mar.
4, 2017).
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followers without violating New York Civil Rights Law.7 The
Humans of New York project includes photographing random New
Yorkers on the streets and posting their images on social media to
create a catalog of New York residents and their stories.8 In contrast,
the artist Arne Svenson and his project titled “The Neighbors” raised
many questions regarding the scope of the New York Civil Rights
Law, which provides the basis for the right of privacy.9 Many people
would believe that circulating a photograph of a barely clothed child
that was taken with a special lens through the window of the child’s
home is an invasion of privacy. Yet, as exemplified by this Note, this
is not redressed under New York State law.10 Currently, unlike other
states, New York State’s privacy statute is too narrow to encompass
this type of conduct, which was challenged in Foster v. Svenson.11
7 See HUMANS OF NEW YORK, http://www.humansofnewyork.com (last visited Mar. 4,
2017); See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (“Any person whose name,
portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes . . . without the
written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the
supreme court of this state.”). In addition, New York Civil Rights Law section 50 provides
that it is a misdemeanor for “a person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
first obtained . . . written consent . . .” N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 50 (McKinney 2009).
8 See HUMANS OF NEW YORK, supra note 7. All individuals are aware their photo is being
taken and give consent that it be published on social media. HUMANS OF NEW YORK, supra
note 7.
9 Eugene Volokh, NY Court Legal to Surreptitiously Photograph People in Their Homes,
and Sell Those Photos, THE WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/10/n-y-court-legal-to-surreptitiously-photographpeople-in-their-homes-and-sell-those-photos (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
10 Foster v. Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038 (2013) at *1 (“While it makes Plaintiffs cringe to
think their private lives and images of their small children can find their way into the public
forum of an art exhibition, there is no redress under the current laws of the State of New
York.”). Id.
11 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 105; Volokh, supra note 9.
In most states photographing someone in their home with a telephoto lens would indeed be
tortious, under the “intrusion upon seclusion” tort; as the Restatement notes,
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
[Comment b:] The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in
which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces
his way into the plaintiff’s room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s
objection in entering his home. It may also be by the use of the
defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs
windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wire.
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This Note will discuss the tension between two fundamental
freedoms: an individual’s right to privacy and “the touchstone of
individual liberty”––the freedom of expression.12 Part II of this Note
will discuss the facts and procedural background of Foster v.
Svenson. The Foster family alleged that their statutory right of
privacy was violated when the highly acclaimed fine art
photographer, Arne Svenson, published photographs of their barely
clothed children.13 Svenson asserted that his photographs were
constitutionally protected by his freedom of expression.14 Part III
will discuss the decision of the First Department which immunized
Svenson’s conduct, finding it beyond the reach of the privacy laws.15
Part IV will examine the balancing test adopted by the federal courts,
which balances the government’s interest in protecting an
individual’s privacy against protecting freedom of expression.16
Although the federal courts place a heavy weight on the sacrosanct
freedom encompassed within the First Amendment,17 in each
generation and each situation, the theory underlying an individual’s
right to privacy and expression requires reevaluation.18 Part V will
discuss the statutory right of privacy in New York Civil Rights Law
sections 50 and 51.19 Mindful of the inherent tensions, the New York
State legislature enacted a privacy statute, which is to be “narrowly
construed and strictly limited to non-consensual commercial
appropriations of the name, portrait or picture of a living person.”20
However, by implementing such a narrow approach, New York State
courts have failed to consider an equitable balance between free
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
12 5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 20.2.
13 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
14 Id.
15 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96.
16 See discussion infra Part IV.
17 See discussion infra Part IV.
18 T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 894
(1929) [hereinafter General Theory of the First Amendment].
19 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (“Any person whose name,
portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes . . . without the
written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the
supreme court of this state.”). In addition, New York Civil Rights Law section 50 provides
that it is a misdemeanor for “a person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
first obtained . . . written consent . . . .” N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009).
20 Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038, *1 (2013).
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speech and privacy on multiple occasions. This failure is exemplified
in the case of Foster v. Svenson, where the Appellate Division
considered whether the New York Civil Rights Law granted an
individual the right to prohibit a photographer from displaying his
photographs in art galleries or whether the First Amendment instead
allowed unlimited dissemination of such image.21 To grant an artist
such broad First Amendment protection is to essentially eliminate the
right of privacy.22 Thus, approximately one month following the
decision, a bill, which is currently pending, was introduced in the
New York State Assembly to amend the New York Civil Rights Law
to prohibit conduct such as taking photographs of a person within the
confines of his or her home where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy.23 This Note will argue that in order to deal with the
increasing threat to an individual’s privacy evidenced in Foster v.
Svenson, this amendment to the New York privacy statute should be
enacted.24 By adopting this amendment, the legislature would strike
a balance between the interests of an artist’s freedom of expression
and the invasion of an individual’s right of privacy within his or her
home.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF
FOSTER V. SVENSON

Martha and Matthew Foster brought a suit on behalf of their
children when they learned through various media coverage that the
defendant, Arne Svenson, had been secretly snapping photographs of
three-year-old Delaney Foster and one-year-old James Foster from
behind the curtains of his own apartment and displaying and selling
the images to the public.25 Svenson, an artist noted for his eerie and
eccentric photography, embarked on a yearlong project in which he
hid in the shadows of his darkened apartment, and waited for his
neighbors to appear in the window.26 He used a high powered

21

Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96.
Id. at 102. “To give absolute protection to all expressive works would be to eliminate
the statutory right of privacy.” Id.
23
Bill A. 07804, S. 0583.
24 Bill A. 07804, S. 0583.
25 Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038 at *1 (2013).
26 Id.
22
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camera that was originally used for capturing images of birds. 27 The
floor to ceiling windowpanes of the neighboring building naturally
framed the focal point of Svenson’s still-life exhibit entitled “The
Neighbors.”28 Svenson’s images captured intimate family activities
of several tenants residing at 475 Greenwich Street.29 The residents
were unaware they were being photographed while they were
watching television, completing household tasks, and enjoying a meal
at their dinner table.30
There is no dispute that Svenson took the series of
photographs without consent.31 Nevertheless, the photographs were
exhibited in galleries in Los Angeles and New York, on gallery
websites, as well as Svenson’s personal website.32 When Mrs. Foster
discovered a photograph which displayed James barely clothed, and a
photograph which displayed Delaney in a bathing suit, she
telephoned Svenson demanding removal of the pictures from every
forum.33 Svenson, acknowledging the photographs may invite a
question of privacy, agreed to stop showing and selling the
photograph of James.34 However, he refused to do so with respect to
the photograph of Delaney.35 Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs. Foster
retained counsel who sent cease and desist letters to the defendant,
galleries, and websites, demanding removal of the photographs of the
Foster children.36
The defendant, galleries, and websites all
37
complied.
Notwithstanding the Fosters’ efforts, a photograph of Delaney
appeared in various electronic articles, printed articles, and television

27

Id.
Id.
29 Complaint at 17; Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. The photographs were offered for sale for between $5,000 and $7,500 by an online
art gallery called “Artsy.net.” Id.
33 Complaint at 17; Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005).
34 Raffi
Khatchadourian, Stakeout, The New Yorker (May 27, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/27/stakeout (explaining how Svenson
consulted with his lawyer prior to the commencement of this action when he was told, “In a
city where people are so tightly crammed together, there is a scant presumption of
privacy.”).
35 Brief of Plaintiff at 17; Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005).
36 Id.
37 Id.
28
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broadcasts, including NBC’s “TODAY Show,” where the Fosters’
building address was revealed and Delaney’s face was clearly
recognizable.38 Concerned with their children’s safety, the Fosters
immediately sued Svenson seeking injunctive relief pursuant to New
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51, which grants such right to
an individual whose name or likeness is used without consent for
commercial advantage.39
In opposition to the motion for injunctive relief and crossmotion to dismiss the complaint, Svenson claimed exclusive
proprietary rights to the photographs.40 Svenson asserted that the
First Amendment’s freedom of expression protected his artwork.41
Bolstering this claim was the extensive critical acclamation from the
artistic community regarding Svenson’s creative work.42 The artistic
community likened Svenson’s photographs to other famous
“surveillance photography” that may have challenged an individual’s
privacy yet were viewed as creative expressive works.43 Counsel for
Svenson pointed out other renowned artists and photographers such
as Andre Kertesz, Michael Wolf, and Cartier-Bresson who have
similarly photographed individuals through windows, but whose
actions have not been challenged.44 According to the artistic
community, Svenson’s work was an intellectual and artistic
masterpiece that compelled society to consider central issues such as
the societal boundary lines that divide the public from the private
through the use of his photographs.45
38

Id.
See supra note 19 (The Fosters only sued Svenson individually; they did not sue the
news stations or the websites that displayed the images.).
40 Brief of Plaintiff at 17. Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1 st Dep’t 2005).
41 Brief of Defendant at 17, Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005).
42 Brian Boucher, ARNE SVENSON BASKS IN COURT VICTORY, (Aug. 16, 2013)
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/arne-svenson-basks-in-courtvictory/.
43 Id. See also Rena Silverman, ANDRE KERTESZ WATCHING FROM ABOVE, (May 4, 2015),
http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/andr-kertsz-watching-from-above (explaining the
career of the artist Andre Kertesz and his experience and success with surveillance
photography).
44 Id.
45 See THE NEIGHBORS, http://mcadenver.org/arnesvenson.php, (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
(“Capturing the lives of his neighbors (their habits, activities, tastes) over the course of a
year, Svenson also used the geometry of the buildings’ windows as his frame, creating
various tableaux of domestic life unfolding. Presenting over 20 photographs from this series,
The Neighbors, this exhibition explores in depth the central issues raised by these enigmatic
39
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The Supreme Court of New York County held that the New
York and Federal constitutions granted Svenson the freedom to
display his photographs and thus the New York Civil Rights Law
Section 51 did not apply.46 The court rejected the Fosters’
application for a preliminary injunction and granted Svenson’s
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to show a likelihood of
success based on sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law.47 The court considered whether Svenson’s use of the
photographs qualified as the kind of commercial appropriation that
the statute prohibited, and found that the photographs served to
promote artistic creation rather than commercial gain.48 The court
held that the First Amendment shields Svenson’s photographs from
the reach of New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. 49 The
court stated, “Art is considered free speech … visual art is as wide
ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book,
treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full
First Amendment protection.”50
III.

THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S DECISION

On appeal, the Appellate Division for the First Department
affirmed the decision of the New York County Supreme Court to
grant Svenson’s motion to dismiss the complaint.51 The Appellate
Division analyzed the legislature’s intent to protect the rights
prescribed by the First Amendment.52 To preserve legislative intent,
the court recognized two fundamental principles. First, the statute

works: voyeurism, the increasingly imperceptible boundaries between privacy and the
public, and the ubiquity of the camera in our surveillance-obsessed world.”). Id.
46 Svenson, 2013 WL 3989038 at *1 (2013).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
52 See General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 18, at 894 (“The values sought
by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression may be grouped into four broad
categories. Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring
individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing
participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decision-making,
and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society.”). Id.
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prevents the commercial exploitation of an individual’s likeness.53
Second, the court held that the statute does not apply to any form of
information which is considered newsworthy.54 Since public interest
is deemed essential, the court granted extensive leeway in classifying
newsworthy speech.55 The court held that newsworthiness extends to
social trends, consumer reports, and political activities.56 The court
concluded that newsworthiness also applies to modes of artistic
expression because they serve to provide aesthetic value to society
and thus deserve to be disseminated in light of societal interests.57
However, the court noted that to grant an unconditional right
to disseminate all forms of newsworthy speech would eliminate
privacy laws altogether.58 The court explored two limits of the
newsworthy exception and described two tests to determine when the
defendant’s publication of a photograph should be classified as
newsworthy speech: 1) the “advertisement in disguise” test; and 2)
the “no relationship” test.59 Therefore, if the court found Svenson’s
photographs fell within one of the two limitations, his claim of
newsworthiness would fail.
The first limitation to the newsworthy exception is the
“advertisement in disguise” test, which applies to an image used
primarily for a commercial purpose. The test asks whether an
advertisement is being disguised as a non-commercial publication or
whether the fundamental function is a commercial purposes.60 The
court cited Beverley v. Women’s Med. Ctr., which held that the
defendant could not claim the newsworthy and public concern
exception to escape the reach of the statute when the plaintiff’s
photograph was used in a calendar that was strictly meant to be an
advertisement to promote sales of such calendars.61 The images of
the Foster children aided in promoting Svenson’s work and in turn
53

Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96; see General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 18.
Id.
55 Id.
56 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96.
60 Id.
61 See Beverley v. Women’s Med. Ctr., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1991) (explaining that
the image displayed in the calendar was mistakenly used for a commercial purpose and
therefore was not incidental).
54
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produced revenue. Generally, art is created to be offered for sale.
However, the court did not apply this “advertisement in disguise”
limitation. The court said that even though profit may have been
derived from the sale of the images, such profit does not diminish the
constitutional protections afforded to them under the First
Amendment.62
The second limitation of the newsworthy exception is the “no
real relationship test.”63 To demonstrate when to apply the test, the
court cited Murray v. New York Mag. Co., where the defendant used
the plaintiff’s photograph to supplement his article regarding the sale
of drugs to which the plaintiff had absolutely no connection.64 The
New York Court of Appeals in Murray set forth a test, which states
that if there is no relationship between the publication and the
accompanying photograph, then it is implied that the image’s only
purpose is to encourage the sale of the publication. In the case of The
Neighbors, the newsworthy exception to the statute does not apply.65
Most pictures in The Neighbors exhibit are aesthetically pleasing and
fit into the general theme of capturing unanticipated moments in
human life.66 Notwithstanding the fact that the Fosters had absolutely
no real or personal relationship to The Neighbors exhibit, the court
did not apply this limitation; rather, it applied the newsworthy and
public concern exception. 67 The court rejected the Fosters’
allegations and declined to adopt either of the limitations to the
newsworthy exception.68
The court found that the photographs were artistic expressions
in the form of artwork and therefore a public interest. The very
function of the newsworthy and public concern exception is to afford
First Amendment protection to works of art.69 The court reasoned
62

Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96.
Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96.
64 267 N.E.2d 256 (N.Y. 2010).
65 Id.
66 Supra note 45.
67 Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 103 (“Similarly, when a court determines that there is no real
relationship between the use of the plaintiff’s name or picture and the article it is used to
illustrate, the defendant cannot use the newsworthy and public concern exception as a
defense . . . . Applying the newsworthy and public concern exemption to the complaint
herein, we conclude that the allegations do not sufficiently plead a cause of action under the
statutory tort of invasion of privacy.”).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 100.
63
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that the images themselves constitute a work of art, and the
advertising and sale of the photographs were encouraged in this
case.70 However, the court also noted that no question was presented
as to whether a particular photograph should be considered a work of
art. Svenson’s ability to sell photographs of the Fosters’ likenesses
and call them “art” is the fundamental issue in this case.
For
example, New York’s Civil Rights Law expressly prohibits the sale
of a person’s image for the use of advertising or trade without his or
her consent. But, the court stated, “part of the protection of free
speech is the right to disseminate the ‘speech,’ and that includes
selling it.”71 This conclusion assumes that Svenson’s photographs
are in fact “art.” However, consider the following: How close to the
Fosters’ home could Svenson place his camera before his
photographs cross the fine line between “art” and “intrusion”? What
if Svenson used a camera with night vision capability to capture
images at night? These inquiries highlight the fact that the current
law does not address rising privacy concerns. To resolve this issue,
the court was obliged to rely heavily on legislative history and case
law72 but ultimately observed that the case’s specific facts prompt
attention from the Legislature. The court stated:
To be sure, by our holding here—finding no viable
cause of action for violation of the statutory right to
privacy under these facts—we do not, in any way,
mean to give short shrift to plaintiffs’ concerns.
Undoubtedly, like plaintiffs, many people would be
rightfully offended by the intrusive manner in which
the photographs were taken in this case. However,
such complaints are best addressed to the Legislature
the body empowered to remedy such inequities.73
The current structure of New York’s privacy law does not cover the
issues that have arisen in the past few decades in the world of
photography. The traditional rationale the legislature relied upon to
enact the privacy law is strictly limited to unauthorized commercial
use of a person’s image. However, in Foster v. Svenson, the issue is
70
71
72
73

Id.
Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 103 (quoting Simeonov, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1993)).
See supra Part I (explaining the basis for the right of privacy).
Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 106.
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not the commercial use of the photographs but rather the way in
which the photographs were taken. This course of action infringed
upon the reasonable expectation of privacy within one’s home. The
photographs were advertised, sold for profit, and obtained without
consent, yet the court found that Svenson’s photographs were not
used for “advertising purposes” or for the purposes of “trade” under
the meaning of the statute.74 The court mentioned the absence of
legal authority regarding the holding. The court explained, “We are
constrained to find that the invasion of privacy of one’s home that
took place here is not actionable . . . pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of
the Civil Rights Law. . . [W]e are constrained to apply the law as it
exists.”75 In other words, the court was obliged, forced or compelled
to find that the “troubling facts” in Foster v. Svenson did not fall
under the protection of New York’s narrow statutory right of
privacy.76 The conduct in Foster v. Svenson raises both social and
legal issues that should now be addressed by the New York courts or
the legislature.
IV.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states
in pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”77 Federal courts have
consistently favored granting broad First Amendment protection to
preserve the essential liberty of a free nation.78 The First Amendment
grants the freedom of expression to advance knowledge of society
and discover truth.79 However, the directive to make no law
“abridging the freedom of speech” is not absolute or without
exceptions.80 Federal courts engage in a balancing test to determine
74

Id.
Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 98 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The New York State Constitution upholds with more specificity
the same fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States. The New
York State Constitution provides, “Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his or
her sentiments on all subjects . . . and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty
of speech or of the press.” N.Y. CONST., art. I § 8.
78 See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967); Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
79 See General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 18.
80 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 151-52 (1765-1769).
75
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the scope of the First Amendment by evaluating freedom of speech
versus other compelling individual rights such as the right of
privacy.81 According to the federal courts, art is considered protected
speech because it conveys ideas and emotions by transcending the
boundaries of language and culture.82 Art is a classic form of speech
and a core value that is entitled to First Amendment protection.83 The
federal court has taken the position that “the First Amendment
doctrine does not disfavor nontraditional media of expression,” like
modern art, but “protects all forms of peaceful expression.”84 Thus,
if a photograph is deemed an artistic expression, it is entitled to the
First Amendment’s protection.85 However, this traditional legal
precedent is called into question by our society when a photograph is
considered an artistic expression and simultaneously an invasion of
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
When a constitutional provision and a statute conflict, the
court is obligated to exercise its judicial review.86 In order for the
New York privacy statute to limit the power of First Amendment
rights, the court must interpret the statute under strict scrutiny and
find that the limit is narrowly tailored to preserve a compelling state
interest.87 According to the federal courts, there is a compelling state
interest to provide society with a reasonable expectation of privacy
and unwanted intrusions within a person’s home.88 However, federal
courts have also held that newsworthy or public interest speech
transcends statutory privacy rights.89 The general rule is that the
government should not restrict speech if it is related to suppression of
free expression.90 Therefore, when a photograph invades an
81

5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 20.7 (b) (1) (2014).
Id.
83 Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
84 Id. at 352.
85 Id.
86 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (granting the Supreme Court the
power of judicial review).
87 5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 16.1 (d) (2015).
88 Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 348.
89 Id. “[P]ure first amendment speech in the form of artistic expression . . . deserves full
protection, even against . . . statutorily-protected privacy interests.” Id.
90 5 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 16.1 (d) (“The general rule is that the government may
restrict speech if it meets a four part test: (1) if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; (3) if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the
82
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individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the federal courts will
favor the freedom of expression.91 The federal courts have
mentioned three compelling state interests, which weigh heavily in
favor of the freedom of expression that is granted by the First
Amendment.92
One compelling interest which justifies the broad freedom of
expression is the circulation of news and information. The United
States Supreme Court, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, represents
the majority’s interpretation of the First Amendment that individual
privacy fades when publicly known information is reported as
news.93 The Court in Cox held that the press is free to disseminate
public information that is already part of the public domain.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp, defendant Wassell was employed
as a news reporter whose sole function was to investigate
newsworthy events and subsequently televise them.94 The rape and
murder of seventeen-year-old Cynthia Cohn was the topic of his next
report.95 In order to gain information for the news report, Wassell
personally attended the criminal trial.96 During the court recess,
Wassell approached the court clerk and requested a copy of the
murder and rape indictments that listed the name and identity of the
victim.97 The court did not dispute that this information gathered was
public knowledge.98 However, Mr. Cohn, the victim’s father, filed
this action when he learned the local television station had released
personal information including the name of his daughter and the
details of the incident.99 The father was appalled to find that the

incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.”).
91 Id.
92 See supra section IV for a full discussion of federal compelling state interests.
93 Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469.
99 Id. The televised report stated, “Six youths went on trial today for the murder-rape of a
teenaged girl. ‘The six Sandy Springs High School boys were charged with murder and rape
in the death of seventeen-year-old Cynthia Cohn following a drinking party last August 18th.
The tragic death of the high school girl shocked the entire Sandy Springs community. Today
the six boys had their day in court.” Id. at 475.
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name of his daughter was released to the public via a local station and
that he knew many of the viewers.
The procedural history of the Cox case emphasizes the two
opposing arguments regarding the specific issue of protecting
information that is already public. In the trial court, the broadcasting
company argued that the broadcast should be protected under the
First Amendment’s freedom of speech.100 The court rejected the
argument and granted summary judgment in favor of the father based
on a criminal statute.101 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court
agreed with the trial court’s holding that the First Amendment did not
automatically protect the defendant because “the rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment do not totally abrogate the right of privacy.”102
The court found that the trial court erred in applying the criminal
statute to a civil case, and instead found that the relevant cause of
action was invasion of privacy: the tort of public disclosure.103 The
court also found that summary judgment was improper because a
question of fact remained as to whether the publication actually
invaded the father’s “zone of privacy.”104 Thus, on the motion for
rehearing before the Georgia Supreme Court to determine the privacy
issue, the broadcasting company asserted the newsworthy exception,
but the court denied it.105 As a matter of policy, the court relied on
the statute as an authoritative declaration that the name of a rape
victim is not a matter of public interest even though it was public
knowledge at the court proceedings.106 The court balanced the
government’s interest of protecting a father’s invasion of privacy
against protecting the freedom of speech. The Georgia Supreme
Court found in favor of the father’s right of privacy and held that the
statute was a limitation of the freedom of speech.107 This reasoning
supports the position that despite the public nature of the
photographs, the Fosters should be protected by the privacy statute as
a matter of public policy. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 475 (citing Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541 (1971)).
Id.
Id.
Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469.
Id.
Id.
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Court reversed the decision in Cox.108 The Court reasoned that the
facts in Cox did not permit the state to protect the father’s right of
privacy.109 The Court conceded “there is a zone of privacy
surrounding every individual . . . where the state may protect him
from intrusion by the press.”110 This zone of privacy should prevail
when the press oversteps its rights by publishing private
information.111 In such situations, the Court stated there should be a
remedy for such alleged abuses.112 However, the Court concluded
that the facts in Cox did not merit the protection since the information
was a matter of public record.113 Similarly, it can be argued that the
Fosters’ zone of privacy within their home was relinquished when
they opened the blinds, which subjected them to the intrusion of the
press.
This discussion begs for answers to the fundamental questions
regarding the Fosters’ right of privacy--Why did the Fosters fail to
shut their blinds if they did not want the public gazing inside the
windows of their apartment? Similar to the information in Cox that
was already public knowledge, the opened blinds subjected the
Fosters to neighboring eyes of the public. Further, did the Fosters
waive their expectation of privacy by keeping their blinds open?
Even if the Fosters assumed the public could gaze inside their
apartment windows, did they expect anyone would be taking pictures
of their children getting dressed? Even if people could reasonably
gaze into an apartment, people would generally not expect that their
image would be captured. Was this degree of intrusion reasonable?
Moreover, did the Fosters expect anyone to share those pictures with
the public? The Restatement (First) of Torts states that in a privacy
action, liability is measured by the defendant’s conduct and whether
he should have realized that his conduct would be offensive to
persons of ordinary sensibilities.114 It is only where the defendant’s
intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability
accrues.115 Since the Fosters kept their blinds open, they left
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id.
Id.
Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 207 (2012).
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themselves open to the possibility of someone looking in from the
outside. However, very few New York City residents would
reasonably expect that a camera lens is capable of capturing the
subjects inside the window of a four-story apartment building.116 The
reasonable expectation of privacy should not disappear simply
because the fourth-story window is open. It would be an improper
extension of this argument to conclude that the Fosters subjected
themselves to having their picture taken and published to the public.
The Fosters expected that no one would take their photo even if the
blinds were open. Nevertheless, even if we concede that Svenson
rightfully obtained the photographs since the Fosters’ blinds were
open, the question then becomes -- Was what Svenson proceeded to
do with the photographs permitted under the law?
The federal courts’ general position is the following: if the
information that is being published gives further publicity to
information that is already part of the public domain, the court will
not impose liability.117 Further, the Court in Cox emphasized the
government’s responsibility to provide society with informative news
coverage of matters regarding legitimate public concerns and found
that the facts presented fell within the public’s concern.118 Therefore,
federal courts encourage the spread of information, news, and media
that are already public knowledge.119 Whether Svenson’s images of
the Fosters represent information that was already part of the public
domain is one question that does not seem to have a clear answer.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Cox which granted First
Amendment protection is distinguishable from the holding in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard, which did not grant First Amendment
protection.120 Two years after Cox, the United States Supreme Court
in the seminal case, Zacchini, revisited the issue in Cox and held that
the protection of an individual’s privacy from intrusion of the press is

116

Complaint at 3 (The Fosters live on the fourth floor of a modern building composed of
glass walls located in Tribeca. Svenson lives in a second-floor loft located across the
street.).
117 See infra Part V.
118 Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 494.
119 Id.
120 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977); Compare Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. 494, with Zacchini,
422 U.S. at 574.
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itself a compelling state interest.121 The right of privacy includes the
right to prohibit a person from using an individual’s name or likeness
for commercial gain, known as the right of publicity. The benefit
from the use of a person’s proprietary interest in his or her own
image may be given with consent.122 However, in Zacchini, the
plaintiff did not grant that consent. Therefore, plaintiff brought an
action against the broadcasting company for violating his right of
publicity by recording and airing the entire performance of a human
cannon ball stunt on television.123 Although the plaintiff did not want
his stunt to be aired to the public, the broadcasting company
recorded and aired the entire performance.124 The performance held
personal value to the plaintiff because it reflected his hard work and
was to remain only within the family.125 By airing the entire
performance on television, the broadcasting company reduced the
incentive for viewers to watch the plaintiff’s act live and thus
inhibited the plaintiff’s ability to earn his livelihood. The trial court
granted the broadcaster’s summary judgment motion.126 On appeal,
the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of the
plaintiff’s right to protect his performance from being shown on the
air.127 Subsequently, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on First
Amendment grounds.128 The court found that “entertainment, as well
as news, enjoys First Amendment protection” and neither the public
nor the plaintiff will be deprived of this benefit so long as the
plaintiff receives adequate compensation.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the First Amendment diluted the right of publicity when the
speech concerns matters of public interest.129
Balancing the
121 Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). (“There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as
news, enjoys First Amendment protection.”); See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is
not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.”).
122 Id.
123 Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 567.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 567. Zacchini deals specifically with the tort of the right of
publicity, which is one of the four branches within the right of privacy. Zacchini, 422 U.S. at
2855.
129 Id.
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government’s dual interests, the Court in Zacchini held the scale
tipped in favor of the right of publicity. The Court did not dispute
that the First Amendment granted wide-ranging permission to report
on matters of public interest that may in turn invade a person’s realm
of personal privacy.130 However, the Court’s holding was based on
the policy behind the right of privacy, which is closely analogous to
the goals of patent and copyright law.131 In cases of entertainers,
there is usually no objection to the broadcasting of a performance so
long as the entertainer is compensated.132 The policy behind the right
of publicity according to the Court has little to do with protecting
feelings or reputation, but is more concerned with protecting a
proprietary interest of the individual and rewarding him for his
endeavors.133 The Court stated, “We are quite sure that the First
Amendment . . . do[es] not immunize the media when they broadcast
a performer’s entire act without his consent.”134
Similar to the reporter in Zacchini, Svenson displayed the
Fosters’ images in several museums, which in turn furthered his
career, and resulted in increased attention from the media and
certainly compensation. Furthermore, the Fosters were not paid to be
subjects of The Neighbors exhibit. When one party is enriched based
on a detriment to the other party, the court generally finds unjust
enrichment. The Court pronounced that the First Amendment does
not protect deceitful or egregious conduct used to achieve a personal
goal and it can be argued that Svenson’s conduct was deceitful.135 In
a situation when one party is unjustly enriched due to an invasion of
privacy, federal courts are more willing to find in favor of an
individual’s right to privacy.136 The question becomes whether
Svenson was unjustly enriched through the use of the Fosters’
images. Similar to the plaintiff in Zacchini, the Fosters did not
consent to the use of their children’s images. Furthermore, it can be
argued that Svenson was unjustly enriched and benefited from the use
of the Fosters’ photographs. The law as it exists protects individuals
130

Id. at 567.
Id. at 576-78. The goals of patent and copyright law are to avoid unjust enrichment by
recognizing the reward to the owner. Id.
132 Id. at 573.
133
Id.
134 Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 574-76.
135 Zacchini, 422 U.S. at 574.
136 Id.
131
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from being unjustly enriched. However, this remedy would not solve
the problem in Foster v. Svenson.
If the Fosters wanted
compensation for the use of their image, the court could have
awarded damages based on the right of publicity.137 The right of
publicity grants a public figure compensation when his or her name,
likeness, or image is used for a commercial purpose to sell or endorse
a product.138 However, the Foster family was not looking for
compensation nor did they give consent to use their images. Instead,
the Fosters wanted protection within their home and freedom from
the intrusion of the press.
In Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that First Amendment
protection is not granted to a publication that is used for purpose of
trade.139 Were Svenson’s photographs obtained solely to promote his
exhibit and the sale of his work? The Fosters claimed that the
photographs were used for the “purpose of trade” and therefore were
not entitled to First Amendment freedom of expression.
In Titan Sports, the court set forth the “incidental use” test to
determine if a publication was considered used for the purpose of
trade according to the statute.140 World Wrestling Federation, also
known as Titan Sports, Inc. (“Titan”), owned all publicity rights
concerning the wrestlers’ likenesses.141 Titan sold licenses to third
parties that wished to make products that bore the wrestlers’ names
and likenesses.142 The suit was brought against the publishing
company for publication of a magazine, which included full size
posters of the wrestlers without their consent or without obtaining a
license from Titan.143 The United States District Court for the
137

Id. at 573.
White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
139 Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989). Titan agreed
that the photographs were used for advertising purposes; the issue was whether they were
used for the “purpose of trade.” Id. The Titan court said, “The fact-finder should consider a
variety of factors to determine the purpose of trade, including but not limited to the nature of
the item, the extent of its relationship to the traditional content of a magazine, the ease with
which it may be detached from the magazine, whether it is suitable for use as a separate
product once detached, and how the publisher markets the item.” Id.
140 Id. at 87-89.
141 Id. at 87.
142 Id.
143 Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989). “The disputed
photographs are printed in full color on pages four times as large as the pages comprising the
138
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Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the
publisher on the basis that the magazine is a newsstand publication
and therefore the magazine together with the posters stapled within
the magazine are entitled to full First Amendment protection.144 In
contrast, the Court of Appeals found that there was an issue of fact as
to whether these posters were used for the purpose of trade. 145 The
issue before the court in Titan Sports was whether the posters
displaying the wrestlers’ images were entitled to First Amendment
protection because of their placement in a magazine, or instead, not
entitled to First Amendment protection because they were used solely
to promote the sale of the magazine. The court distinguished
between classic public interest as displayed in Cox, and public
interest that is “merely incidental to its commercial use” and
therefore not protected by the First Amendment.146 Unlike Cox,
incidental commercial use exists when there is an insignificant public
interest aspect of the publication but the primary function is
commercial.147 In this instance it seems the court agreed that the
publication should not enjoy First Amendment protection because the
posters’ placement within the magazine was seen as a mere avenue to
promote Comics World sales.148 The Second Circuit stated, “[C]ourts
have recognized that presentation of an item within a publication
generally entitled to First Amendment protection may constitute a use
for purposes of trade, which is not entitled to First Amendment
protection.”149 Since there was a question of fact as to the purpose of
the posters, the court reversed the summary judgment and remanded
the case to the district court noting, “[I]t seems clear that photographs
marketed as posters are used for the purposes of trade” in which case
they will not be protected by the First Amendment.150

balance of the Comic World publications. Up to ten of these photographs are folded and
stapled into the center of each publication so that they may not be viewed it their entirety
unless unstapled and removed. The blurb ‘10 FULL COLOR WRESTLING POSTERS!
HUGE SIZE!’ or some variation of this theme appears on the cover of Comics World’s
publication.” Id.
144 Titan Sports, Inc. 870 F.2d at 85.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147
Id.
148 Id.
149 Titan Sports, Inc. 870 F.2d at 85.
150 Id. at 88. The court did not discuss how the photographs were taken. Id.
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Do the actual photographs of the Foster children have any
significant public interest aspect? There are certainly arguments for
both sides of this query. On one hand, the exhibit itself creates a
commercial interest in the Foster children by depicting them in a
manner which speaks to social norms and artistic meaning. In Titan
Sports, there was a question of fact as to whether the photographs of
Titan wrestlers had a commercial interest because they were used to
encourage the sale of a magazine.151 The photographs of the Titan
Wrestlers were placed in a magazine for sale and the photographs of
the Foster children were placed in an art exhibit for sale. The
difference between Svenson’s use and Titan Sports’ use of the
photographs is minor—both commercial. However, once the
photographs are deemed “artwork,” the public interest increases and
the commercial interest decreases. For example, before the creation
of the exhibit, the Foster children had little commercial interest as
they were not public figures or personalities. Svenson’s exhibit in
effect created a public interest in the images.
Is classifying the individual photographs “art” incidental to
the underlying purpose--to promote the commercial sale of the name
and likeness of the Fosters? The court in Foster said no, and did not
apply the incidental use test adopted by the federal courts. If the
court did apply the incidental use test, the court would have found the
images to be merely an avenue to produce sales for Svenson and thus
deem the photographs a commercial use prohibited by the statute.
Instead, the court in Foster held that Svenson’s photographs were
considered works of art, and any advertising in connection with the
photographs was permissible. Counsel for the Fosters argued that the
images were exploited to both advertise the photograph collection
and the retail outlets exhibiting them. The court found that the
primary purpose of Svenson’s photographs was to promote creativity
and any profit that subsequently resulted was ancillary to the main
function of the artwork. While this is true, this determination does
not resolve the issue which is whether an artist may use another
person’s image and classify it as art when that image was obtained in
an intrusive manner. The current rubric of the New York Civil
Rights Law is outdated because it only addresses issues regarding the
commercial use of an image. The focus should not be solely on

151

Id.
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whether Svenson’s photographs were used for the purpose of trade or
advertising but should include whether the photographs violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the photographs were
obtained in a manner that intruded on an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. The current New York statute only covers the
unauthorized use of an individual’s image for a commercial purpose.
Here, defendant made an unauthorized use of an individual’s image
obtained in a manner which should be deemed unlawful.
A. The Federal Approach Applied to Foster
Similar to the magazine in Titan Sports, which enjoyed First
Amendment protection, Svenson’s exhibit entitled “The Neighbors”
is artwork, which generally enjoys the fundamental protection of the
First Amendment. If the court in Foster were to apply the incidental
use test, the question becomes: Should the actual photographs
captured by Svenson’s camera be protected by the freedom of
expression because they are assembled together in an exhibit titled
“the Neighbors” and called “artwork”? What if an accountant rather
than an artist took and sold the photographs? Would those
photographs still be considered art?
The federal approach recognizes that the publication of
people’s images can be “characterized as having several possible
purposes—they may inform the public [as in Cox], they may
entertain [as in Zacchini], or they may be designed to sell a product,
and thus be essentially commercial in nature [as in Titan Sports].”152
If the publication is “essentially commercial in nature” the federal
courts will not grant First Amendment protection.153 However, the
court in Foster rejected the latter two purposes exemplified in
Zacchini and Titan Sports. The court refused to find that the
photographs were used for a commercial purpose and rejected the
idea that Svenson was unjustly enriched.154 Thus, similar to the result
in Cox, the court held that the First Amendment extends to Svenson’s
artwork since it was viewed as a publication meant to inform the
public.155 In other words, the First Amendment’s protections trump
152
153
154
155

Supra note 120.
Titan Sports, Inc. 870 F.2d at 85.
Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
Id.
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an individual’s right of privacy. If the court in Svenson were to adopt
the federal approach in Titan Sports that the photographs were merely
incidental to the commercial use of the Fosters’ images, First
Amendment protection would not apply. However, the court held
that the money made from selling artwork is not considered a
commercial use and stated that “[t]he value of artistic expression
outweighs any sale that stems from the published photos.”156
It can be argued that the way in which the Fosters’
photographs were obtained separates them from the classic type of
artwork. The method in which the photographs were taken is what
disturbed the Fosters.157 Svenson is not the only artist who has
produced surveillance photography. Artist Michele Iversen created a
series of photographs called Night Surveillance.158 She stated:
As a photographer, I choose to reveal aspects of
human nature that were previously hidden from view.
These unknown images are constructed from real life.
I use the camera as a tool to objectively document and
create intimate discoveries through both systematic
and chance shooting.
In the Night Surveillance Series, I have cautiously and
randomly photographed people inside of their homes
through windows . . . witnessing curious behaviors.
Surveillance is an important element for me. I
fearfully wait for an image to record, and to steal the
privacy of the subject separated only by a window of
glass. These images are motivated by fear. I am
afraid to be seen, afraid to watch at the very same
moment I determine when to suspend a stranger’s
privacy. I feel stimulation from the violation imposed
upon the unknowingly compliant subjects. An intense
aesthetic/erotic friction occurs.
However, I am

156

Id. at 104.
Complaint at 17.
158 Night Surveillance Series, MICHELE IVERSON, http://micheleiversen.com/nsseries.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
157
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compelled to make these images and to expose the
voyeuristic tendencies inherent in human culture.159
It is not unreasonable to conclude that Svenson’s and
Iversen’s surveillance would offend most people. It is clear why
Judge Rakower called upon the New York legislature to revisit this
issue. Surveillance photography reveals intimate moments which
may intrude on an individual’s realm of privacy. The court in Foster
stated that while Svenson’s actions are indeed considered an intrusion
into the home, they do not rise to the level of “atrocious, indecent and
utterly despicable” and concluded there is no viable cause of action
for invasion of privacy.160
Another issue presented by Foster v. Svenson is the status of
surveillance photography as art. Surveillance photography is not an
original work of art created on a canvas with paint. Instead, it is
merely a snapshot of a moment in time. Under the copyright laws a
minimal degree of creativity is required to secure copyright
protection.161 Similar to the copyright law, the right of publicity is
based on the doctrine of fair use. Simply stated, the doctrine of fair
use allows individuals to use materials that are protected by copyright
if that use is transformative and does not negatively affect the market
for the original work.162 In the case of Foster v. Svenson, would there
be more or less artistic originality if instead Svenson painted the
Foster children in a lifelike manner? Is there more creative skill
involved in a painting than taking a photograph? While many
photographs are considered art, the question becomes how much
originality is required before the photograph evolves from “stalking”
to “artwork”? The courts, however, have refused to define what is
considered art.163
Nevertheless, the right of publicity is an intellectual property
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or
her identity.164 In New York, the photograph at issue in Foster
contains a type of property right--the Foster children’s image and
likeness which the right of publicity should protect. In an attempt to
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 105 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 207 (2012).
Appropriated Moments, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103 (2015).
Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
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reconcile the dubious gaps in privacy law, one may argue that the
photographs should be considered used for a commercial purpose
because they incorporate not just artistic creation, but the subjects’
property, their right of publicity. If the Foster children wanted to
claim that their right of publicity was violated they would also have
to prove that they, and therefore Svenson, had commercial value in
their image and likeness. Ironically, a New York federal court was
the first to acknowledge an individual’s right of publicity.165
However the only right of publicity accepted by the New York courts
is encompassed within New York’s Civil Rights Law.
V.

NEW YORK’S RIGHT OF PRIVACY STATUTE

New York’s right of privacy is set forth in New York Civil
Rights Law sections 50 and 51, which prohibit the unauthorized and
commercial use of a person’s likeness.166 Penal in nature, section 50
provides that it is a misdemeanor, whereas section 51 provides
injunctive relief for a violation of the statute.167 However, New
York’s statutory right of privacy is not absolute.168 In order to
maintain a balance between the right of privacy and the New York
Constitution, the legislature engrafted exceptions within the language
of the statute.169 New York courts adopt a narrow meaning of the
terms “advertising and trade.”170
This narrow interpretation
essentially decreases the scope of protection afforded by the
statute.171 Similar to the federal approach, the New York Court of
Appeals adopted the newsworthy exception and applied it liberally.172

165

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953);
Leonard M. Marks & Robert P. Mulvey, Celebrity Rights Law Needed in New York 4, N.Y.
L.J. (Nov. 6, 1995) (stating that in Haelan, the federal courts of New York were the first to
recognize an independent common law right protecting plaintiffs’ economic interests).
166 See supra note 7.
167 See supra note 7.
168 Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 360 (N.Y. 1952).
169 Jaime Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 2000) (“A Civil
Rights Law claim may lie [only] if (1) a plaintiff’s picture is used purely for trade purposes,
and (2) not in connection with a newsworthy article.”). Id. at 550.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See supra Part III for a discussion on the two limitations to the newsworthy exception;
see also Finger v. Omni, 77 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990) (explaining that questions of
‘newsworthiness’ are better left to reasonable editorial judgment and discretion; judicial
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Therefore, even though New York grants a so-called statutory right
of privacy, the courts apply the statute only in limited circumstances
to promote legislative intent.
The New York legislature enacted sections 50 and 51 in
response to the decision in Roberson v. Rochester.173 The defendant,
a company in the business of manufacturing and selling white flour,
created and circulated 25,000 lithographic prints of the plaintiff’s
likeness for the purpose of profit and personal gain.174 The prints
showed the plaintiff’s face, together with the company’s name,
manufacturer, and logo.175 The advertisement was displayed in
stores, warehouses, and public places specifically in the area where
the plaintiff resided, as well as in other areas of the United States and
abroad.176 The plaintiff sustained humiliation and shock from the
public display of her image.177 The Court of Appeals of New York
held the right of privacy is a non-actionable right because it is “purely
sentimental” in character. 178 As a result, defendant’s flour company
was unjustly enriched by the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s
photograph.179 The unfairness of the decision prompted an outcry
from the public over the unauthorized use of plaintiff’s photograph
and emphasized the need for the authority to afford protection for an
individual’s privacy.180
In the Foster decision, the court asked the legislative body to
consider the creation of a statute that would prohibit the use of a
person’s image without his or her consent solely for the furtherance
of his own personal benefit.181 The New York State legislature was
the first to recognize a statutory right of privacy founded on the belief
intervention should occur only in those instances where there is ‘no real relationship’
between a photograph and an article or where the article is an ‘advertisement in disguise.’).
173 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Roberson, 64 N.E.2d at 544 (The Court of Appeals of New York was hesitant that if a
plaintiff had a right of privacy to his own likeness, there would be a vast amount of “absurd”
litigation.). Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. “Needless to say, as illustrated by the troubling facts here, in these times of
heightened threats to privacy posed by new and ever more invasive technologies, we call
upon the Legislature to revisit this important issue, as we are constrained to apply the law as
it exists.” Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 106 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015).
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that “a man has a right to pass through the world without having his
picture published.”182 In 1903, the New York legislature enacted
sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law to rectify the
negative result in Roberson.183 The privacy statute was drafted to
apply specifically in situations similar to Roberson, which concern
only the commercial use of a photograph.184
A. The New York Approach
It is well established that when a publication causes tension
between privacy and free speech, New York’s privacy statute asks
whether the specific publication falls in either the category of
“advertising or trade” or in the “newsworthy exception.”185 As
exemplified in the cases discussed below, these categories are
ambiguous and have resulted in different interpretations. However,
the common consensus of New York courts has been to limit granting
protection under sections 50 and 51.
In Arrington v. New York Times, the court determined the
meaning of “trade” proscribed by the statute.186 The Arrington test
ignores the motive for creating the work, and instead focuses on the
underlying nature of the work itself.187 If the nature of the work itself
is newsworthy, then it is not considered used “for the purpose of
trade.”188 Since the enactment of the privacy statute in 1903, courts
have held that the fact that a publication is produced for profit or
even that a picture is included in the publication for the sole purpose
of increasing profit, does not constitute a “use for trade.”189 Further,
the statute does not define the term “advertising,” but the court in
Flores v. Monler stated that advertising has been understood to mean
“a use in, or as part of, an advertisement or solicitation for
182

Supra note 76; see also Right to Privacy, supra note 2, at 195.
See supra note 76 at 908.
184 Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982) (“It is
noteworthy, therefore, that, while concern engendered by this decision prompted the
Legislature to enact sections 50 and 51, these were drafted narrowly to encompass only the
commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness and no more.”).
185 See supra Part V.
186 Arrington v. New York Times, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1329 (N.Y. 1982).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580; Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.E.2d at 359; Arrington v.
New York Times, 434 N.E.2d at 1329.
183
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patronage.”190 As exemplified in this Note, the precise meaning of
these terms caused uncertainty in the case of Foster v. Svenson.
In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals in Stephano v. News
Group explained that any publication concerning a matter of public
interest cannot be considered used for the purpose of trade or
advertising.191 In Stephano, a professional model sued a publishing
company for displaying an image of her modeling a bomber jacket in
a magazine without her consent.192 The image was displayed
alongside an article in New York magazine with information about
new products available in the area and described the bomber jacket as
a “cotton-twill version with ‘fun fur’ collar features the same cut at a
far lower price––about $225. It’ll be available in the stores next
week.”193
The New York County Supreme Court granted judgment for
the defendant reasoning that the article informed the public about the
fashion industry, and therefore the newsworthy exception applied.194
The Appellate Division of the First Department disagreed with the
lower court’s reasoning and reversed in favor of the model.195 The
First Department said that any rational person would conclude that
the publishing company used the image for the purpose of advertising
its product.196
However, the New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the
First Department and found that the statute should not only apply to
matters of public concern, such as political news and social trends,
but also to articles that offer information to consumers.197 In
Stephano, the court held that the plaintiff’s photograph was a public
interest protected by the newsworthy exception because the model’s
image was used to convey the availability of a new clothing item.198
Regardless of the existence of advertising and trade in
Stephano, due to the use of a model’s image in order to display the
190

Flores v. Monler, 7 N.Y.2d 276 (1959).
Stephano v. News Group Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
192 Id. at 581.
193 Id. at 582.
194 Id. at 585-87.
195 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580. The First Department decided Foster v. Svenson in the
contrary. See discussion supra Part III.
196 Id.
197 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580.
198 Id.
191
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clothing to consumers, the court reasoned that the fashion industry is
a mode of public interest.199 In other words, a consumer would
consider the image an advertisement. It is inherent in the nature of a
publication that it produces profit, but such motive is not the
determining factor in deciding newsworthiness. Instead, it is the
content of the article itself that is considered newsworthy.200 The
Court of Appeals’ holding in Stephano illustrates the broad
application of the newsworthy exception, finding that it applies not
only to classic news reports such as political happenings and social
trends, but also to fashion articles aimed towards interested and
paying consumers.201
This decision applies the newsworthy
exception broadly to include even articles of consumer interests
including developments in the fashion world.202
B. The New York Approach Applied to Artwork
The issue of whether the statute should exempt an artistic
expression would be an issue of first impression for the New York
Court of Appeals. However, some lower court decisions demonstrate
that an artistic expression falls outside the confines of the statute203
and have facilitated the distinction between privacy law and artistic
expression.
In 1993, the Civil Court of New York in Simeonov v. Tiegs
held that an artist could portray a person’s likeness without written
consent and sell some limited number without violating the statute.204
An Appellate Term, First Department order left open the question of
whether the defendant’s actions constituted “trade” and were
therefore prohibited by the statute.205 The suit arose out of a dispute
between an artist and his model. Artist Mihail Simeonov created a
199

Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580.
Id.
201 See Finger, 77 N.Y.2d at 143 (explaining that classic news is not the only type of
speech protected by the newsworthy exception); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (stating that “[t]here is no doubt that
entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.”).
202 Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 580.
203 Altbach v. Kulon, 754 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2003); Nusseenzweig v.
Dicorcia, 832 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007); Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d
1014 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
204 Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
205 Id.
200
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plaster casting of the head of a fashion model Cheryl Tiegs.
Although Simeonov had Tiegs’ consent to create the plaster castings
of her head, he did not have consent to produce a modified cast
created from the original cast. Simeonov intended to make ten
bronze copies of the mask and sell them for $20,000 each.206
However, he never got the chance to do so because a maintenance
worker accidentally broke the mask beyond repair.207 Simeonov sued
Tiegs to recover the money he intended to make from the masks.
Tiegs claimed as a defense that Simeonov never had permission to
make the modified casts and argued that Simeonov’s creation of the
plaster mask violated New York’s Civil Rights statute because he
used her image without her consent for the purpose of trade or
advertising.208 Tiegs alleged that Simeonov’s reproduction of her
likeness harmed her because she did not want her image circulated.
The court held that an artist can create a work of art that includes a
person’s likeness and sell a limited number of copies without consent
and without violating the New York Civil Rights statute.
The court reasoned that by their very nature, works of art are
created for the purpose of human expression, not for purpose of trade,
and asked why can only a limited amount be sold?209 The fact that
profit is subsequently derived is not a determination of commercial
use.210 If the nature of the work is considered a matter of public
interest as in Stephano, the Court of Appeals of New York has
consistently held that the statute does not apply because the work is
not being produced for advertising or trade, as long as only a limited
number of copies is sold. This raises the question --where should the
court draw the line on that limitation? The fact that there is no direct
answer to this question is one reason why New York Civil Rights
Law should be amended. Simeonov correctly applied the rule of law
stated in Stephano—the motivation to raise profit is not the only
factor in the determination of whether a work was used for trade; it is
the content and the limited amount sold that counts.211

206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Id.
Id.
Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
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Ten years after Simeonov, the Third Department of the New
York State Supreme Court Appellate Division provided clarification
in Altbach v. Kulon and held that if a painting constitutes a parody, it
is considered an artistic expression exempt from the statute.212 In
Altbach, an artist created an oil painting depicting a caricature of a
local Town Justice with devil’s horns.213 When the Town Justice
sued, the Supreme Court granted an injunction prohibiting the artist
from displaying the image. Subsequently, the Supreme Court
imposed a $3,850 fine for the violation of the injunction when a
newspaper featured a photograph of the artist holding up the
painting.214 The Third Department affirmed the Supreme Court’s
decision and concluded that even the newspaper article displaying
the name and photograph of the Justice is ancillary to the painting
because it helped to communicate a message through an artistic
expression.215 The court found that both the oil painting and the
image in the newspaper were “part and parcel” of a parody. 216 This
decision stands for the possibility of an additional exception carved
out by the majority of New York courts--that the unauthorized use of
a photograph may fall outside the reach of the statute if there is a
message or transformative element added to the photograph.217 The
court found that the newsworthy exception did not apply in this case
because of the exception for works of art which states that any
advertising done in connection with such works is protected by the
First Amendment.218
VI.

CALIFORNIA’S RIGHT OF PRIVACY STATUTE

The deficiency of the New York’s Civil Rights Statute is
illustrated by a comparison with the privacy laws in other states. In
an influential article, Dean Prosser outlined four different types of
212

Altbach, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
Id. at 655.
214 Id. at 657.
215 Id. at 658-59.
216 Id.
217 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (“For purposes of
determining whether parody of copyrighted work is “fair use,” inquiry focuses on whether
new work merely supersedes object of original creation or whether and to what extent it is
“transformative” and alters original work with new expression, meaning or message.”).
218 Altbach, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
213
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privacy.219 The United States Court of Appeals stated that “the right
of privacy and the right of publicity protect fundamentally different
interests and must be analyzed separately.”220 The right of privacy
generally protects the right to be let alone while the right of publicity
protects a celebrity’s pecuniary interest in the commercial
exploitation of his or her identity.221 California recognizes a statutory
right of publicity, statutory right of privacy, and a common law right
of publicity.222 The California right of privacy statute says that if an
artist’s skills and talents are manifestly subordinate to the overall goal
of creating a portrait that commercially exploits a celebrity’s fame,
then the artist’s First Amendment right is outweighed by his right of
publicity. However, New York does not recognize a statutory right
of publicity nor a common law right of privacy or publicity.223
Furthermore, California’s privacy statute was recently amended to
incorporate protection in visual images. The privacy statute states:
A person is liable for a physical invasion of privacy if
the person knowingly commits an act of trespass in
order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff
“with the intent to capture any type of visual image,
sound recording, or other physical impression of the
plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity,
and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive
to a reasonable person.224
A person is liable for a constructive invasion of
privacy in these circumstances, regardless of whether
there is a physical trespass, if the visual image, sound
recording, or other physical impression could not have
been achieved without a trespass unless a visual or
auditory enhancing device was used.225
Separate and apart from the right of publicity statute which
deals with the commercial use of a person’s likeness, this privacy
219

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983).
221 Id.
222 ROTHMAN’S
ROADMAP
TO
THE
RIGHT
OF
PUBLICITY,
http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law/california, (2017).
223 Id.
224 (C.C. 1708.8(a).).
225 (C.C. 1708.8(b).).
220
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statute deals specifically with the type of conduct in Foster v.
Svenson. The statute specifically mentions that an invasion of
privacy occurs if a person used a visual enhancing device to capture a
visual image. If applied to Foster v. Svenson, it is likely the court
would find a constructive invasion of privacy due to Svenson’s use of
a visual enhancing device to obtain the images. For example, In
Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc., the United States District Court in
California stated that the elements for invasion of privacy are: (1) an
intentional intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter (2)
in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.226 If Svenson
photographed the Fosters in California the application of this statute
may have resulted in a different outcome for the Fosters. The
California right of privacy is not absolute; it must also be balanced
against the public interest in the dissemination of news and
information under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and the press.227
VII.

BALANCING THE EQUITIES

In the wrestling match between the freedom of speech and the
right of privacy, New York and federal courts balance the equities
and have reached different results.228 In the specific situation when
an artist’s right to artistic expression is in tension with a person’s
right to control his image, New York should adopt a new approach.
The decision of Foster v. Svenson demonstrates the existence of a gap
in New York’s privacy law, which fails to cover situations that may
arise in the developing field of art and photography. Photographers
have had the ability to take photographs through unblocked windows
for a long time and have not been faced with lawsuits. Nevertheless,
the court in Foster admits that the mere classification of “art” should

226

551 F. Supp. 2d 1183. To prevail on the first element, the plaintiff must show that he
had a reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or data
source. Medical Lab., 306 F.3d at 812–13. In determining whether an alleged intrusion is
“highly offensive” for purposes of the second element, relevant considerations include “the
degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as
well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded. Id.
227 Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 228 (1953).
228 See discussion supra Parts IV and V.
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not protect the invasive manner in which such art is created.229
However, in order to encourage artistic creation, the freedom of
expression has consistently been afforded to individuals despite
invasiveness. Implementing a broader privacy statute may leave
room for possible First Amendment issues although First Amendment
rights do not completely abrogate the right of privacy. 230 However,
the New York courts seem to find just the opposite. The New York
approach has essentially swallowed the statute’s protection by
applying the newsworthy exception in virtually every situation which
implicates the First Amendment. Simply put, the protection granted
by the statute will not apply to artwork if the term “commercial
purpose” does not apply to artwork.231 In contrast, a broader privacy
statute must not violate the First Amendment. Thus, the perfect
balance between these equities have been established in the proposed
amendment to sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law
which is currently pending before the legislature.
VIII. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO § § 50 AND 51
The New York State Assembly proposed a legislation to
amend the New York Civil Rights law in relation to capturing the
visual image of a person in a dwelling. The purpose of the
amendment is specifically to prevent people from having their images
taken within their homes. The summary of the amendment’s
provisions is as follows:
Section 1 - Amends § 50 of the civil rights law to
include a prohibition on knowingly capturing the
image of another person within a dwelling, when that
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. A
person in violation of this section will be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Section 2 - Amends § 51 of the civil rights law,
allowing a person whose image is captured in

229
230
231

Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d at 96.
Id. at 475.
Id.
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violation of § 50 to maintain an equitable action, and
to also sue for any damages incurred.232
In order for a more equitable result in situations where an
artist’s First Amendment rights invade an individual’s privacy, New
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 should be amended with
this clear language. The statute should be interpreted to adopt a
balance between the government’s interest in encouraging artistic
creation against the interest of protecting an individual’s right of
privacy. By implementing strict scrutiny this amendment addresses
compelling governmental interests. If the First Department were to
apply this balance in Foster v. Svenson, the result could have been
different for the Foster family. For example, Svenson’s photographs
can be considered artistic expression that should be protected by his
First Amendment rights if they were obtained in a non-intrusive
manner. On the other side, this grant of freedom should not infringe
other fundamental rights such as the right of privacy. Svenson’s
rights under the First Amendment should depend on the purpose for
which the photographs are used and the means by which they are
secured. The court should balance these factors in determining this
issue.233 The photographs are highly intrusive into the sacred corners
of the Fosters’ home. The images invade the privacy of the Fosters’
children. In this case, a judge may find the balance of privacy
interest of an individual child to outweigh an artist’s freedom to
display these images to the public. Under this solution, the court will
maintain the legislative intent by protecting both the freedom of
expression and the right of privacy. The amendment will uphold both
constitutional rights and privacy rights and will withstand
constitutional scrutiny so long as it is narrowly tailored to deal
strictly with the type of conduct it intends to remedy. The directive
to make no law “abridging the freedom of speech” is not absolute. A
statute may be enacted if it satisfies the government’s test of strict
scrutiny. The amendment will withstand strict scrutiny if its purpose

232

See Amendment to N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51.
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (confronting potentially
conflicting privacy and free speech claims with long-standing doctrinal support, the Court
balanced the relevant interests).
233
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is to provide society with a reasonable expectation of privacy within
their homes.234
IX.

CONCLUSION

Over one hundred years ago, the famous Warren and Brandeis
article suggested that the law must keep pace with the changing times
and the progress of the human mind.235 This statement is even more
true today. Such progress of the human mind produces new
technologies that change the way society conducts itself. The camera
first appeared in the 1820s and operated in commercial
establishments with bulky equipment and complicated techniques.236
Today, the camera is a portable device that anyone can use to capture
an intimate moment with one snap of a button. With the growth of
modernistic art, such as surveillance photography, the New York
legislature must also anticipate the growth of privacy concerns in this
field.
Thus, the legislature should consider the surrounding
circumstances when there is a conflict between privacy and the
freedom to create art.
Similar to the unfair result in Roberson, which prompted the
creation of the statute, there is also an unfair result in Foster v.
Svenson. This result should alert the legislature to the need to once
again revisit privacy rights. Due to the gap in the New York statute,
the privacy of the Foster children was invaded with no avenue of
judicial relief. Perhaps this Note will encourage a new discussion on
the issue of the right of privacy in our generation.
The increased complexity and intensity of modern
civilization and the development of man’s spiritual
sensibilities have rendered man more sensitive to
publicity and have increased his need of privacy,
while the great technological improvements in the
means of communication have more and more
subjected the intimacies of his private life to
exploitation by those who pander to commercialism
234
When a challenged action burdens a fundamental right, the standard is heightened
scrutiny which will be upheld only if the government establishes a compelling justification.
235 Right to Privacy, supra note 2.
236 TODD GUSTAVASON, CAMERA: A HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY FROM DAGUERREOTYPE TO
DIGITAL 2-4 (2009).
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and to prurient and idle curiosity.
A legally
enforceable right of privacy is deemed to be proper
protection against this type of encroachment upon the
personality for the individual.237

237

Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273 (1952).
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